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THINKING AS AN ANTIDOTE TO EVIL: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE IDEAS
OF HANNAH ARENDT
To think and to be fully alive are the same thing. 
Hannah Arendt
Two events make us reflect today on the thought of Hannah Arendt. The first is that 
in late 2006 a century had passed since the author of Eichmann in Jerusalem was 
bom. The second is the launch of the Polish edition of her new book, Responsibility 
and Judgment (Arendt, Warszawa 2006).
The centenary of her birth is a good occasion for conducting at least a general 
overview of Arendt’s most absorbing ideas. As is well known, she achieved fame 
thanks to The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951); an important book, in which she 
came up with the concept of total power, while also presenting a strong thesis on 
the comparability of Fascism and Stalinism. It is worth mentioning that this was the 
cause of the first publisher rejecting her text.
Arendt’s next major work was The Human Condition (1958). In it, the philoso­
pher presents the réévaluation that took place in the Modern Age - the reversal of 
the traditional hierarchical order of vita contemplativa and vita activa (Arendt 2000: 
313)- Nowadays, we have grown used to perceiving work as the most precious of 
values. This allows us to indulge in our second passion - consumption. Arendt 
points out the fact that we trust more in “action” than in “contemplation and obser­
vation.” When we act, we tend to suppress thinking. When we stop thinking, we 
refrain from making judgments, and so are in danger of creating fertile ground for 
the spread of evil.
It is clear that Arendt would have come across the great importance of contem­
plation in human life while working on her doctorate on the thought of Saint 
Augustine. The author of Confessions, in his reflections on work (which are similar 
to those of the other Church Fathers) recommends combining physical and mental 
work. He also argues that a good profession (for example, that of craftsman or 
farmer) does not fully occupy a man, so he has enough time and energy to contem­
plate “higher ends.” This aspect of existence is diametrically opposed to the situation 
in which modem man finds himself - his absorption in work deadens his contem-
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plative life. This is quite alien to the citizens of Ancient Greece, who were not occu­
pied by the pursuit of daily needs or distracted by mundane chores. Indeed, this 
train of thought alone is sufficient to reveal that Arendt’s outlook springs, ideologi­
cally, from the culture of Ancient Greece. While discussing the similarity between 
the views of the author of On the Will and the thesis of the author of The City of God 
it is necessary to point out another theme of her reflections - the problem of think­
ing. She repeats, after Augustine, that thinking is an activity led by love towards that 
which exists, whereas evil destroys that which exists. It follows that thinking inclines 
us to protest against wrongdoing because evil destroys that which exists.
THINKING AND EVIL
Here we approach Arendt’s fundamental concept, formulated in the subheading of 
her next book - Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963). 
Before she became an adherent of this thesis she had taken a position in defense of 
the existence of radical evil. Such was her initial conclusion when examining the 
nature of totalitarianism - being unable to understand mass murders committed 
without a comprehensible motive, she talked about absolute evil.1 But in 1961, in­
fluenced by Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem, where she worked as a reporter for The 
New Yorker, she changed her point of view. Trying to understand the evil done by 
Eichmann, and after a stormy exchange of thoughts in her letters (including, cru­
cially, with her teacher Karl Jaspers), she formulated her famous thesis on “the ba­
nality of evil.” Although she emphasized the originality of this expression on numer­
ous occasions, it first appears in Karl Jaspers’ correspondence with Arendt (Arendt 
1993). This finding should not deprive her of the merit for having carried out the 
diagnosis and portrayed the phenomenon. We might say, a little disingenuously, that 
as a matter of fact the use of Jaspers’ expression confirms another of Arendt’s opin­
ions - on the communicative aspect of human existence. It is thanks to the ex­
change of thoughts that we are able to verbalize our own point of view.2 In addi­
tion, more of Jaspers’ ideas are echoed in Arendt’s outlook; for example, his refusal 
to credit Hitler with “the satanic greatness” to which he was, after all, aspiring. Jas­
pers denies the depth of Hitler’s thought and his power of intention. Hitler should 
not be put on a par with other criminals, not even with the literary characters of 
Dostoyevsky’s novels (Raskolnikov or Stavrogin) who would think out the greatest 
crimes in order to achieve greatness.
1 After the experience of World War I and his observation of human activity, Sigmund 
Freud formulated a thesis concerning human nature. He left no illusions and stated that man 
is capable of doing evil without hesitation. Plus, if he can benefit from it, he will not analyze 
if damage done to others in order to achieve a goal is going to be proportional to the profit 
gained (see: Freud 1992: 93-94). It is worth mentioning that Arendt was granted the Sigmund 
Freud Award.
2 It has already been noted by Ludwig Feuerbach that dialogue opens up the possibility of 
searching for truth - along with another person we are given a sensually experienced reality 
and thanks to dialogue we are able to check our ability to perceive it, and are also able to be 
certain of its existence.
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In Responsibility and Judgment - a book recently published in Poland, which 
gathers together all but one of the essays and lectures completed after the Eichmann 
trial, while searching for an answer to the nature of evil, our philosopher notes that 
Eichmann was not a monster or a cruel beast personifying absolute evil. She had 
already stated in Eichmann in Jerusalem that “even with the greatest goodwill it is 
impossible to see in Eichmann any diabolic or demonic depth” (Arendt 1987: 371). 
When she sees this ordinary, conscientious bureaucrat she comes to a different con­
clusion from before - the evil is not absolute, but stems above all from an incapacity 
for thought. As a result of his thoughtlessness, Eichmann played out the role of the 
biggest criminal of our times.3 Being only a “mindless cog” in the bureaucratic ma­
chinery of a totalitarian regime, he underwent the dehumanization visible in his 
ceasing to think. As Helmuth Plessner’s political anthropology holds, what distin­
guishes a man from other beings is his full capacity for reflection (Plessner 1994).
3 Arendt’s thesis on the banality of evil has caused a lot of controversy. After the publica­
tion of the book on the Eichmann trial, she lost a lot of friends. Even today, the book results 
in many polemics. Recently N. Mailer raised it in his book about Hitler - The Castle in the 
Forest (2007). In essence, Mailer’s book is based on a dispute with Arendt’s theses. He rejects 
her concept because it underestimates the evil in the world. He claims that a thesis on the 
banality of evil is more dangerous than claiming that evil is satanic, because in this case the 
struggle between good and evil is discarded. Mailer obviously favors a Manichean outlook on 
the world.
The key question is - what functions as an antidote to evil? Thinking, of course. 
Thinking is an activity that “has particular moral consequences - someone who 
thinks constitutes him or herself as a person or personality” (Arendt 2006: 134). The 
initiation of a thought process is a precondition for making a judgment. When we 
restrain from expressing an opinion we fail to castigate evil and thus allow it to 
spread. The message that emerges from Arendt’s latest book is that we should not 
lose the ability to react by making judgments of whether a given occurrence is wor­
thy to exist in our world or not. This leads us on to the next conclusion, which is 
that it is best for the public sphere, politics, if as many opinions as possible are ex­
pressed. This, of course, brings to mind the idea of a public debate. The classic 
authors of liberalism assumed that human beings are to some extent rational; they 
believed that public debate (for example, a plenary debate in parliament) makes it 
possible to construct political truth out of these rational elements. Of course this is 
only under the condition that a proper discussion takes place, with a clash of op­
posing standpoints.
However, it needs to be pointed out that thinking as a remedy for evil, as pro­
posed by Arendt, bears features of idealism. If we look more closely at everyday 
situations we might ask when people make an effort to think. This happens when 
they are forced by some sort of necessity, when a problem arises. In postulating 
permanent thinking, Arendt again appears as a follower of ancient culture. It was in 
Ancient Greece that citizens had at their disposal something facilitating reflection
- free time. As we know, at that time the economy was based on slavery, which 
exempted proprietors from the struggle for daily bread. How could anyone today
- without proper economic security - spend two weeks deliberating, as Arendt did 
with her masters, Heidegger and Jaspers, over the sentence “ein guter Vefrs ist ein 
guter Vers”? The author of The Human Condition is a contemporary Greek. The 
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ideas she proposes do not fit easily with the spirit of our times. Jaspers, her master, 
seems to be closer to a diagnosis of modernity than her. He claimed that a man lets 
external situations prevail on him without any reflection on his part, and that only 
under the influence of stimuli does he start the process of thinking (and therefore 
the process of returning to oneself). Jaspers defined these circumstances as “limit 
situations.” They include: death, struggle, suffering and guilt. According to Jaspers 
a man is distinguished not by who he in fact is, but by what he creates from himself 
both in the process of thought and of action.
POLITICS
The issue of the communicative aspect of existence has already been raised. How­
ever, it must be emphasized that it also relates to the realm of politics. Arendt goes 
back to the Greek (more precisely, Aristotelian) understanding of politics as action 
and speech. The political situation is one of conversation. Politics takes place when 
we create the law and institutions; for example, when we want to build a school or 
a hospital and, through discussion and negotiation, that is conversation, we reach 
certain conclusions. Moreover, politics has an anthropological aspect as well. In 
politics we reveal ourselves, and, more precisely - our ability to make judgments 
and therefore, de facto, our ability to think. This is how thought, the foundation of 
Arendt’s political philosophy, is revealed. Therefore politicality is a conversation; 
politicality is created in situations where there is an equality of sides and one talks 
while the other listens; politicality assumes that the opinions of others are taken into 
account. Political power is understood by Arendt as an ability to act communica­
tively, which is endangered by violence. According to Arendt politics ends where 
violence begins. This is another indication of her inspiration coming from Greek 
ideas. So in trying to find the causes of a contemporary political crisis (the dissolu­
tion of democratic power), she came to the conclusion that they lie in the blurring 
of the distinction between the private and public spheres. In ancient times violence 
existed in the private sphere because of a lack of equality, but in the public sphere 
there was no violence and the rule of equality was in force. In modem times the 
masses succumbed to ideologies postulating the broadening of the political sphere 
(the masses being granted political freedom) and introducing equality into the pri­
vate sphere, which created the basis for revolution. As a result of the leveling of the 
difference between these spheres, equality and the principle of non-violence no 
longer hold in the public sphere.
Returning to Arendt’s thesis on the appearance of violence being the end of poli­
tics, and to her idea of politics as a dialogue between equivalent subjects, it should 
be pointed out that historical experience teaches us quite the opposite. We learn 
that man shows an inclination to domination that is difficult to resist and is revealed 
at every step: “as a result of congenital traits, people themselves always, everywhere 
and openly rule over those who they are stronger than” (Tukidydes 2004, vol. 2: 
470-471) It is extremely difficult to achieve a situation in which there is an equal 
dialogue. We differ because of many factors, including social status and education. It 
has recently been shown by Michel Foucault that even in a doctor’s surgery, when 
both the doctor and patient are bound by a joint interest (the patient’s recovery), 
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domination comes into play - the doctor possessing knowledge, possesses power. 
Furthermore, power hierarchizes and is inclined to extend its sphere of influence. 
After all, violence itself, in all its possible forms, is difficult to eradicate from the 
public sphere.
PHILOSOPHY VERSUS POLITICS
This question leads us back to one of Arendt’s most ambitious books - The Human 
Condition - in which she tries to separate pure philosophy from thinking about 
politics. She emphasizes the difference between the high expectations of the private 
sphere’s vita contemplativa and the different set of values of the public sphere’s vita 
activa. This is why she outlines the character of public life’s distinct vocabulary, 
which is subject to its own rules. It might be mentioned in passing that Arendt did 
not see herself as a philosopher, but as a political theorist. When a journalist intro­
duced her as a “philosopher,” she protested that she did not feel like one and did 
not think that other philosophers would accept her into their circle. Naturally, this 
was modesty speaking, but she also had a concrete aim - to expose an inevitable 
tension between philosophy and politics. Arendt’s aspiration and aim was, as she 
used to say, to analyze politics “with an eye un-blurred by philosophy.” In her 
opinion, it is difficult for intellectuals to think about politics clearly as they see eve­
rywhere the operation of ideas.
It is difficult to disagree with her when it comes to the division of philosophy 
and politics. This is not an isolated opinion in the history of ideas. Spinoza had al­
ready made similar comments: “It is obvious that politicians have written about po­
litical matters far more adeptly than philosophers” (Spinoza 2000: 335). This is 
mainly because philosophers think in absolute categories, while ignoring that which 
exists. They do not perceive people as they are, but as they would like them to be.
PRINCIPLES
The problem of the relationship between philosophy and politics correlates with 
Arendt’s belief that there are no general principles that with any degree of certainty 
could be applied to concrete examples. According to her, there are no general crite­
ria that would allow us to formulate judgments in a reliable manner. We may remark 
that this idea has been well known since ancient times. It was not only Aristotle (the 
philosopher most highly valued by Arendt) who noted in his Nichomachean Ethics 
(Book V, 7 1134b) that fire burned both there and among the Persians, but that jus­
tice differed. The Sophists had themselves already stated that the essence does not 
lie in the correctness of one ethical theory or another, but in the degree of applica­
bility. Protagoras emphasized that for a given nation at a given time given customs 
and principles were best. According to him, there are no absolute political standards. 
They change according to place, time and circumstances. Similarly, Gorgias, another 
Sophist, emphasized that it is impossible to unconditionally define what is appropri­
ate and what is not. This can only be defined by practice. He came to the conclu­
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sion that our actions depend on circumstances. The ideas of the Sophists do not 
seem to differ from the intention of the author of Truth and Lying in Politics. For 
her, the problem of the relationship between philosophy and politics took on the 
form of the relationship between theory and practice and thought and action. This 
dissonance was observed by Spinoza: “A conviction has arisen that of all the applied 
sciences politics is the one in which theory most departs from practice” (Spinoza 
2000).
HISTORY
Responsibility and Judgment contains another of Arendt’s polemical thoughts. It 
involves, namely, our relationship to History. Arendt claims that analogies from the 
past cannot be of any help to us in solving present-day crises. To justify this opinion 
she points out that political activity is characterized by chance, which limits the use 
of analogy. She emphasizes its dependence on actual circumstances. Of course she 
did not mean to dispute the importance of the past: “The world we live in at the 
moment, is the world of the past; it consists of the souvenirs and remains of what 
people have done (for good or bad)” (Arendt 2006: 299). She rejects, however, the 
possibility of using “the lesson of history” in predicting the future and remarks, 
ironically, that if history teaches us anything, it is as murky as the prophecies of the 
Delphic Oracle.
I agree with Arendt that when it comes to particular political situations drawing 
a simple historical analogy is inaccurate. It seems to me, however, that historical 
analogies are extremely useful when examining the mechanism of political systems. 
It is enough to cite Book 8 of Plato’s Republic to see that the critique of democracy 
is to a large extent applicable to the mechanisms of twentieth-century democracies. 
Arendt herself, in The Origins of Totalitarianism, draws our attention to particular 
symptoms of power changes, in order to predict what they could lead to. The im­
portance of historical arguments in the realm of politics is also noteworthy. Knowing 
that past actions brought about a certain result, we could perform them again in 
order to achieve analogical or similar effects. Historical argumentation is of great 
didactic importance - nothing captures our imagination more than well-chosen ex­
amples from history. After all, historical reference plays a role in political propa­
ganda. It can, for example, antagonize relations between countries.
There are many significant ideas in Arendt’s writings; for example, her extremely 
valuable analysis of the social and emotional mechanisms of revolutionary move­
ments in On Revolution (1963). However, in these reflections I have followed 
Arendt’s own postulate and applied the criterion of writing only about those ideas 
which forced me to think.
Nazism and Stalinism are long gone, as is the Eichmann trial and the polemics 
between Arendt and, for example, Gershom Scholem. But her postulate of not re­
fraining from the challenge of thinking, as being essential to our humanity, is no less 
relevant today. We must, after the Epicureans (as emphasized by the author of On 
the Will), keep repeating to ourselves their command, lathe bidsas - “live secretly.”
4 As G. Mosca says, the Rome of Machiavelli differs from the republican one. 
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Thinking is a distinct, if invisible, activity, which perhaps for that very reason allows 
us to fool others (or even ourselves) that we are up to the task.
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